In finite noncooperative game, a method for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations is developed. The method is prior-based on sampling fundamental simplexes being the sets of players' mixed strategies. Whereas the sampling is exercised, the sets of players' mixed strategies are mapped into finite lattices. Sampling steps are envisaged dissimilar. Thus, each player within every dimension of its simplex selects and controls one's sampling individually. For preventing approximation low quality, however, sampling steps are restricted. According to the restricted sampling steps, a player acting singly with minimal spacing over its lattice cannot change payoff of any player more than by some predetermined magnitude, being specific for each player. The finite lattice is explicitly built by the represented routine, where the player's mixed strategies are calculated and arranged. The product of all the players' finite lattices approximates the product of continuous fundamental simplexes. This re-defines the finite noncooperative game in its finite mixed extension on the finite lattices' product. In such a finite-mixed-extension-defined game, the set of Nash equilibrium situations may be empty. Therefore, approximate Nash equilibrium situations are defined by the introduced possible payoff concessions. A routine for finding approximate equilibrium situations is represented. Approximate strong Nash equilibria with possible concessions are defined, and a routine for finding them is represented as well. Acceleration of finding approximate equilibria is argued also. Finally, the developed method is discussed to be a basis in stating a universal approach for the finite noncooperative game solution approximation implying unification of the game solvability, applicability, realizability, and adaptability.
Noncooperative-game models
In general conception, noncooperative-game modeling is used for allocating resources rationally when they are exceeded with pretensions. Otherwise, if they are not, the 2. Map fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies into finite lattices.
3. Envisage controllable sample step within every dimension of a simplex. 4 . For preventing approximation low quality, formulate restrictions on sampling steps.
5. Set out a routine for building lattices approximating the sets of players' mixed strategies.
6. Introducing possible payoff concessions, state a routine for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations.
7. The similar routine should be stated for strong Nash equilibria with possible concessions.
8. Estimate periods for solving FNCG with approximate equilibria. 9. Argue for acceleration of finding approximate equilibria. Fulfilling these tasks drives to a universal approach for FNCG solution approximation. And if numbers of DADP and the game cycles are proper, this solution is fully applicable: after having practiced, statistical frequencies approximate enough to support probabilities [13] , [14] .
Preliminaries
Take FNCG (1) of players, where n X is set of pure strategies of the n -th player, and
In FNCG (1) , the set of all mixed strategies of the n -th player is
In situation 
Now, after these preliminaries, every fundamental simplex (3) is going to be mapped into a finite lattice.
Mapping fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies into lattices
Mapping an infinite Euclidean finite-dimensional subset (fundamental simplex) into finite one means selecting sequences of points by a rule. The first part of the rule is that all the pure strategies belong to lattice. The second one is that, for keeping the sample step controllable, may every dimension have its own step. Let 
Lattice (5) is defined with numbers   
Thus the finite lattice (7) approximates the product of fundamental simplexes. Dissimilar steps may be needed in the three following cases:
are pretty different, but players would wish to run through their lattices similarly (with nearly equal operation speed over the support pure strategies).
2. Among its pure strategies, a player possesses more important strategies and less important strategies.
3. Some players require lesser numbers of DADP, otherwise they will not implement their mixed strategies from an FNCG solution.
The case 1 and case 3 needn't dissimilar steps for the player (over its pure strategies). And the case 2 is just for that kind of dissimilarity. The lesser numbers
provide the n -th player with faster solution implementation. However, faster solution implementation yields FNCG approximation low quality. So, sampling steps shall be restricted for the low quality prevention [21] , [22] .
Moreover, numbers   
Restrictions on sampling steps
The restriction concerns the player's payoffs. They should not vary much as situation changes minimally over nodes of the finite lattice (7) . In this way, approximation low quality is prevented. For the q -th player, minimal change of situation (8) is transition from situation (8) to situation (9) such that
. The norm in (10) is Euclidean one in . Following this, the n -th player's payoff variation restriction is that
for some mustn't be too small or else inequality (11) is violated. The restriction (11) at distance (10) for (8) and (9) by 1, q N  implies that as situation changes minimally over nodes of the finite lattice (7), the n -th player's payoff changes no greater than by magnitude n  . For the q -th player, distance (10) is the minimal spacing over its lattice . According to the restricted sampling steps, a player acting singly with minimal spacing over its lattice cannot change payoff of any player more than by some predetermined magnitude, being specific for each player. The lattice minimal spacing depends on how the lattice is built based on (5). Below, a routine for building lattices of players' fundamental simplexes is set out.
Routine for building lattices
For finite lattice (5), let and index its elements as .
By a convention, the first element in (12) is the n -th player's first pure strategy 1
The last element in (12) is the n -th player's last pure strategy
Elements of the set (12) are arranged from (13) right to (14) , where 1 n M  nested loops of this arrangement address themselves to inequality (15) on the finite lattice (5). Within the core, i. e. inside the   
Inside the t -th loop, 1 n M t   probabilities are initialized to zero before checking the inequality (15): The paradigm of calculating and arranging elements of the set (12) shown in Figure 1 completes the routine for building lattices of players' fundamental simplexes. Once we get in the core loop, the inequality (15) 
Minimal spacing over lattice
If integers    . In this case, it is possible to determine the minimal spacing over lattice (12) explicitly. By assigning n nm s s  , according to the routine in Figure 1 ,
As it is easy to see, the n -th player's lattice (12) written here as by the sampling step integer n s becomes fully regular having identical distance between its nodes. This distance is
The n -th player cannot change its mixed strategy less than by (21) . And if all the players use their own constant steps   by denotation (10) . This minimal spacing calculated over the player's finite lattice is like its resolution.
Approximate Nash equilibrium situations with possible concessions
In FNCG (1), classically defined in its mixed extension on the product of continuous fundamental simplexes (3), Nash equilibrium situations  
exist ever. In FNCG (1), defined in its finite mixed extension on the finite lattice (7) which approximates the product of continuous fundamental simplexes ( 
by the n -th player's concession .
by (24), classically, is a Nash equilibrium situation. Henceforward, if
this node by (24) is an approximate Nash equilibrium situation. Let it be called
and permitting also cases when the set (25) is empty. Primarily, inequalities (24) should be verified for null concessions. If set of Nash equilibrium situations appears empty, concessions are necessary. Another necessity of concession is based on that without concessions we may lose Nash equilibrium solutions existing just on the finite lattice (7) as a result of arithmetic, having finite digit precision and roundoff errors. Say, if we have a sampling step 1 3 then even if equilibrium strategy probabilities are only 1 3 and 2 3 we need   
by concessions . For convenience of sweep, the inequalities (27) are stated in the view for the straight search:
Again, if 0
is a strong Nash equilibrium situation. Henceforward, if (27) is an approximate strong Nash equilibrium situation.
-equilibrium situation. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium situation is the particular case of   n n B   -equilibrium situation, and the (classical) strong Nash equilibrium situation is the particular case of the strong
-equilibrium situation.
Routine for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations
In searching   n n B   -equilibrium situations straightforwardly (starting without priorities), every situation
is held at some set
are calculated. Launching the routine for the first player, the n -th player's payoff in left side of (26) 
for the C Q -th coalition C is calculated, where -equilibrium situation is found, and the counter b for strong
-equilibrium situations (approximate strong Nash equilibrium situations)
is increased by 1.
The routine for finding   n n B   -equilibrium situations in Figure 2 is the starter
-equilibrium situations, when N pseudocoalitions by 1 C  are taken. That is why searching approximate strong equilibria should be launched directly anyway.
Estimation of periods for solving FNCG with approximate equilibria
If concessions are null, likelihood of a loop in Figure 2 
of the players' payoffs. For convenience of estimation, it is better to do on normalized payoffs. Thus, for payoff matrices by indexing (2), affinely equivalent transfer (AET) to FNCG (1) is exercised:
and
and 1   . After the transfer, every player has its payoff equal to 1:
If the players' payoffs   1 N n n G are primordially given in the same measuring system, the homogeneous AET to FNCG (1) can be exercised instead of (34) and (35):
for every player 1, n N  . The assignment (36) is used as well. Homogeneous AET by (38) and (39) leaves just a single player or a few players (generally speaking, not all players) having the maximal payoff equal to 1.
The normalization allows taking
by  equal to a few hundredths at most. Similarly to (40), C  is invariable for the same C . However, is recommended for 1
The players' payoffs   1 N n n G will be randomized. So, n J g is a value of the standard normal variate. The sampling steps will be identical for simplicity in exemplification and estimation. Having two pure strategies and two players is trivial and, furthermore, bimatrix games are solved exactly [16] , [17] . Dyadic games are harder in their solving. So, three players and more will operate their two and three and four pure strategies. For estimation, the processor Intel® Core™ i3-4150 CPU@3.50GHz by 4 GB of RAM is used on 64-bit Windows 7. Bad scatters of the periods and the cardinalities are obvious for three players having three pure strategies (Figures 11 -16 ). Apparently, decreasing the 

-equilibrium situations in a 3 3 3   -FNCG, when the sampling step is 1 7 and wider through 1 4 . Cardinalities of those equilibria are unacceptably great. However, approximate Nash equilibrium situations by the probability 1 4 step were found in a second (less than a second; the longest is 0.83 second). And it looks like this approximate equilibria time consumption by   
-equilibrium situations in a 3 3 3 3    -FNCG appeared to be about roughly 100 times longer ( Figure 19 ). Here approximate Nash equilibrium situations by the least probability 1 4 step were found in 37 seconds. A quick comparison of Figure 18 and Figure 
Acceleration of finding approximate equilibria
Figures 4 -20 prompt that, the greater concessions  
are, the more approximate equilibria we obtain. For effective practicing, the best case is when there is a single equilibrium situation or, sometimes, a few ones. The reason is we don't need additional choice problem [23] . Hence, to accelerate finding
-equilibrium situations turns out empty, the failed concessions are increased at a small step. When the expected payoff (4) is calculated, parallelization of matrix multiplication [24] , [25] , [26] can accelerate [27] the routine for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations. Besides, the player's payoffs may be calculated on an individual processor core [28] , [29] , [30] .
Adjustment of magnitudes
is subtler. If the n -th player's payoff variation restriction (11) at distance (10) for (8) and (9) is unfeasible, then either n  is to be increased or sampling steps along simplex (3) dimensions are to be decreased. Any decrement of sampling steps leads to both the routine for building lattices and routine for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations are slowed down. Therefore, magnitudes   1 N n n  primarily are counseled to be assigned great.
Subsequently they may be decreased.
Discussion and conclusion
Whatever method of solving FNCG (1) is used, possible concessions arise always if Nash equilibria are not found. Of course, it concerns other types of equilibria or utility. Another motive of conceding payoffs is the DADP limitation. is ruled by the restrictions imposed on them. Unfortunately, the n -th player's payoff variation restriction (11) at distance (10) for (8) and (9) The version of routine for building lattices in Figure 1 is scarcely unique. But it is not worth to rationalize it -the routine is exercised very rapid. Routines for finding approximate Nash equilibrium situations in Figure 2 and Figure 3 might be optimized, though.
Nevertheless, mapping fundamental simplexes as sets of players' mixed strategies into lattices is followed by the eight plain merits:
1. The introduced fundamental simplexes' sampling allows to solve approximately any FNCG.
2. Owing to the sets of players' mixed strategies in FNCG are finitely sampled, the solution is practiced effectively, i. e. the player's payoff average in the solution situation converges to its expected payoff in this situation (due to that, by the proper number of game cycles, statistical frequencies approximate enough to support probabilities). rationally. This also brings speedup in finding those solutions.
4. Owing to the DADP limitation, the payoff average convergence is rapid needing less game cycles (again, due to statistical frequencies approximate closer to support probabilities). Eventually, the solution or an arbitrary situation becomes applicable.
5. Sampling individually the player's fundamental simplex grants capability to manipulate pure strategies of various ranks. Then, the player samples dimensions of higher ranks with lesser steps, and dimensions of lower ranks are sampled sparser.
6. The routines are programmable within any environment. Priority environments are those who are CUDA enhanced [31] , [32] , [33] supporting multithreading modes [34] , [35] . Special mathematical libraries are unnecessary. Figure 2 and Figure 3 are easily retargeted on other types of equilibria or utility.
The nested loop routines in
The work progression could be focused on the following unclear items: 1. Shall number of game cycles, DADP, and concessions be theoretically bound?
2. Does a maximal sampling step (for fully regular lattice having identical distance between its nodes) exist such that sampling steps mustn't be increased up from this maximum or else solutions become very different every time when sampling steps are changed?
3. Does a minimal sampling step (fully regular lattice) exist such that further decrement down from this minimum gives only similar (close) solutions?
4. Is there any possibility to determine ranges of sampling steps within which a number of approximate Nash equilibrium situations is constant?
These items, if ascertained, are believed to strengthen and supplement those eight merits. Proving theorems on convergence is supposed. But even without rigorous analysis, nonetheless, the suggested simplex finite approximation and concessions direct to solvability and applicability of any FNCG. And this is a basis in stating a universal approach for FNCG solution approximation in wide sense, where solvability, applicability, realizability, and adaptability would be unified.
